Traffic Penalty Tribunal due process complaint

If you want to enjoy the liberties you grew up with, then defend them vigorously!

No 15 Minute Cities

I am slowly learning about the fraud being conducted by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency, more of which later. It feels like every single state institution in Britain is into at least one of treason, larceny, fraud, genocide, or terrorism. In the meantime, my focus is on filing appropriate notices to those who are not only infringing my travel rights, but using rigged tribunals to prevent access to justice and remedy.

This may be grindingly dull stuff at one level, and far from what I would like to be writing about, but it has to be done. Pushing back against the institutionalised corruption — “stealing is OK because the state told me to do it” — is painful work. My Substack readership is stagnant, and that’s OK; I am not in this game to grow a media empire or pursue a writing career. The small number of us who have the dedication and perseverance to walk through this together are the right people for the right job.

If you have any comments or improvements, do let me know. I am working on a parallel document that describes the fraud being committed. There is an additional fraud by DVLA that has been brough to my attention. Unless and until the military step in to remove our belligerent government, then it’s down to us to push back with everything we have. If you give an inch, they will take a mile, and your children’s children will carry the consequences. Freedom of movement and due process are not minor things that are to be compromised or negotiated away.

Traffic Penalty Tribunal
Lack of due process in law

1.     Penalty Charge Notice (PCN) [REDACTED] was issued by Newcastle City Council (“NCC”) to Martin Geddes (“MG”), who objected to alleged unlawful discrimination and civil rights infringements. MG made representations to NCC based in equity and international treaty law, as well as statute.

2.     NCC rejected these representations and offered adjudication via the Traffic Penalty Tribunal (TPT). NCC are aware of the scope and process limitations of the TPT imposed by statute and policy.

3.     A hearing was held with [REDACTED] as adjudicator on 31st January 2024 via video. The hearing was conducted in accordance with The Road User Charging Schemes (Penalty Charges, Adjudication and Enforcement) (England) Regulations 2013 (“The Regulations”).

4.     MG made written representations in advance to the TPT that NCC’s actions were unlawful based in equity and tort. This included a detailed case that the DVLA had miscategorised his vehicle, based on case law of United Biscuits (UK) Ltd vs HMRC (TC/2022/09475). MG asked the adjudicator to read his representations in advance to be clear about his standing, and to apply her mind to take the right action going forward.

5.     There followed no disclosure as to whether the TPT was a suitable venue in that context, specifically whether it was empowered to act as surrogate court of law, or was limited to private arbitration of purely narrow administrative procedure.

6.     In answer to MG’s question about which jurisdiction the tribunal hearing was taking place he was referred to ask the adjudicator during the hearing. There was insufficient time allowed to explore this matter.

7.     MG asked the TPT in advance what the rules of the tribunal hearing are, and was told there are none available in writing, with it left to the discretion of the adjudicator.

8.     MG asked in advance whether there was an overriding objective of tribunal, as per the Civil Procedure Rules, and was told there is not. By implication, the tribunal serves its paymaster, a consortium of local authorities.

9.     MG asked in advance what the technical attendance limit of observers is, as he is a public figure and this is a public interest case. He was referred to ask the adjudicator at the time of the hearing.

10.  Three observers were admitted, and three were excluded, those two being the primary lay legal advisors of MG, and another interested party. The hearing was unfair as it excluded a substantial proportion of public observers, and potentially more observers could have attended (as many would have wished to) if a fair technical limit had been provided in advance. Publicity is the lifeblood of justice.

11.  MG asked in advance for a longer hearing to allow for time to address these additional procedural and jurisdiction concerns, as well as make his case. This was denied. The hearing was limited to the standard slot lasting only 30 minutes, with approximately ten minutes to make his case.

12.  There was no prior disclosure to forewarn that the TPT would have to refuse to consider the merits of arguments rooted in equity, constitutional law, or international treaty obligations.

13.  MG made further oral representations that the actions of DVLA and NCC constituted a tort of conversion. This could be deemed a forfeit of property and travel rights without due process of law in accordance with the Bill of Rights 1689.

14.  MG made the case that the root issue was that Parliament had exceeded its authority in this instance, and that the Tribunal was obligated under constitutional law to uphold the appeal and void the PCN.

15.  MG furthermore asserted that this lack of lawfulness meant that the adjudication was likely ultra viresand resulted in personal liability for any loss or harm.

16.  During the hearing the adjudicator made a plea to NCC to determine if they had leeway to decline to enforce this PCN under the Regulations, but NCC stated they did not have such discretion.

17.  The adjudicator was aware of the likely validity of these arguments rooted in equity, tort, constitutional law, case law, and treaty law, yet dismissed them as “interesting” in the judgement.

18.  It was suggested in the hearing that judicial review was the path to justice and remedy, but this is not its purpose, and is an abuse of process. It is a method of last resort to correct mistakes, not a substitute for systemic failure to uphold the law.

19.  The adjudicator ruled in her judgement that she had “no room” to address any matters outside of the narrow list of approved reasons in the Regulations to approve or deny the appeal. This elevates secondary legislation above constitutional law, equity, and international obligations to due process and non-discrimination.

20.  The adjudicator failed to mention in her judgement that there is no primary legislation for Clean Air Zones, despite it being drawn to her attention, and therefore no direction from Parliament on how to resolve contention between individual rights and collective environmental goals. This omission is unfair, as it denies MG any basis on which to later challenge the TPT’s authority, and acts to sabotage judicial review.

21.  The TPT demonstrated that it lacked the power to challenge policy decisions of the DVLA which are found to be unfair or inequitable. The DVLA’s authority is taken as inviolable.

22.  The TPT lacks the power to challenge lawfulness of the Clean Air Zone regulations when they come into conflict with individual rights. Parliament’s authority is taken as absolute, and without limits on its legitimacy.

23.  The TPT lacks the power to challenge constitutionality of its own adjudication process, and lacks polices and procedures to qualify its standing to adjudicate matters that are more than simply administrative.

24.  The hearing was unfair as it forced MG to make a choice between asking essential procedural questions to his case, especially jurisdiction, and actually making his case.

25.  The hearing was unfair because MG documented many breaches by NCC of the Nolan Principles of Public Life, and this misconduct was not considered, rendering the adjudication lacking in a moral basis.

26.  The hearing was unfair as it demonstrated the TPT does not have a duty to uphold the law, or act as a court of law, but instead to bows to the opinion of the DVLA. This shows that matters of foundational law which are legitimately part of the adjudication, including civil rights and due process, were not given the equivalent force of a court of law via s16 of the Regulations.

27.  The hearing was unfair as the NCC and the TPT failed to disclose its limited remit in advance, despite knowing the nature of the representations and the likely “impedance mismatch”. The omission of this crucial information constitutes a form of fraud, leading to entrapment.

28.  The hearing was unfair as the TPT knowingly acted to aid NCC in committing a conversion tort against MG.

29.  The hearing was unfair as the property rights of MG were not given due consideration. These were subjected to forfeit without any procedural consideration.

30.  The hearing was unfair as the civil rights of MG in relation to non-discriminatory private travel were not given “room” for due consideration. Instead, these were described as a “subjective”, rather than an “objective” case.

31.  The hearing was unfair as it elevates the opinion of the DVLA above substantive evidence, and treats legal fictions (like arbitrary vehicle categories repurposed from one use to another) as lawful fact, in violation of the principles of equity that prefer rationality.

32.  The hearing was unfair as NCC were not required to clarify the legal basis of their claim, notably whether it was because the vehicle’s form or its presumed commercial use.

33.  The hearing was unfair as NCC were not required to evidence or substantiate their claims, effectively being a “guilty until proven innocent”, reversing the usual burden of proof.

34.  The hearing was unfair as it allowed no counter-claim or remedy for infringement of MG’s civil or property rights.

35.  The hearing was unfair as it denied the possibility that Parliament, the DVLA, or NCC could act unlawfully, or indeed criminally by engaging in treason or fraud with intent.

36.  The adjudication was unlawful as no reasonable judge could have come to the conclusion stated based on the full facts and law, yet also simultaneously permitted the adjudication to be treated as equivalent to that of a court of law under s16 of the Regulations, yet acknowledging its own defect by implication in the judgement.

37.  The adjudication was unlawful as equity is the whole of the law, yet it denied access to equitable arguments and relief. MG asserts that a purpose of the TPT is to deny the public access to equity, making it unconscionable as a venue for jurisprudence.

38.  The adjudication was unlawful as it failed up uphold Magna Carta 1215 s39 with a right to a fair trial, a cornerstone of legal and civil liberties.

39.  The adjudication was unlawful as it imposed a forfeit of property and civil rights without charge or conviction, in breach of the Bill of Rights 1689.

40.  The adjudication was unlawful as it fell short of the due process requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998 as specified via ECHR Article 6.

41.  The adjudication was unlawful as it breaches The Local Government Act 1888 s78(2)(a), which prevents councils acting as courts; in this case they have merely formed a consortium to attempt to evade this legal constraint.

42.  The adjudication is unenforceable as s16 is unconstitutional, since it denies due process and acts as an end-run around the requirement for a court of law, this being treason as its purpose is to destroy the constitution.

43.  The Traffic Penalty Tribunal (TPT) is funded by PATROL, a consortium of Local Authorities. There exists a potential conflict of interest due to the funding of the TPT being an agent of the claimant, who may at will impose unreasonable quotas within the operation of TPT with impunity, to affect the outcome. As such, this lack of independence leaves the meting out of justice open to abuse.

44.  The TPT itself failed to uphold the Nolan Principles, in particular through failure to respond to reasonable transparency questions of jurisdiction and technical participation in a virtual hearing. This is done without consequence or accountability.

45.  The summation of all these iniquities is that while the TPT may have a legitimate function in resolving some commercial and administrative disputes, it is unfit for purpose when matters of the lawfulness of the legislation it operates under are in play, or civil liberty matters are raised.

46.  By failing to address the lawfulness of its own conduct, the TPT operates outside of the law, and the actions of its adjudicator in this case are ultra vires.

47.  While there is one final stage of appeal, on the basis of failure to follow procedure or new evidence, this is declined, as to adhere further to this process is to dignify it as lawful by performance and acquiescence, as it is manifestly unlawful, since it lacks fairness, due process, and constitutionality.